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Conducting Monetary Policy
With Inflation Targets
By George A. Kahn and Klara Parrish
S
ince the early 1990s, a number of central
banks have adopted numerical inflation
targets as a guide for monetary policy.
The targets are intended to help central banks
achieve and maintain price stability by specify-
ing an explicit goal for monetary policy based
on a given time path for a particular measure of
inflation. In some cases the targets are expressed
asa range for inflation over time, while in other
cases they are expressed as a path for the infla-
tion rate itself. The measure of inflation that is
targeted varies but is typically a broad measure
of prices, such as a consumer or retail price
index.




a highly forward looking monetary policy.
Given lags in the effects of monetary policy on
inflation,centralbanksseekingtoachieveatar-
get for inflation need to forecast inflation and
adjustpolicyinresponsetoprojecteddeviations
of inflation from target. But central banks with-
out an explicit inflation target may also be
forward looking and equally focused on a long-
run goal of price stability. Thus, at a practical
level, adopting inflation targets may only for-
malize a strategy for policy that was already
moreorlessinplace.Ifso,targetsmightimprove
the transparency, accountability, and credibility
ofmonetarypolicybuthavelittleornoimpacton
the way policy instruments are adjusted to
incoming information about the economy.
This article examines how central banks have
changed their policy procedures after adopting
explicit inflation targets. The first section sum-
marizes the key features that characterize and
motivate most inflation targeting regimes. The
second section documents the procedural
changes that a number of central banks have
takentoimplementinflationtargeting.Thethird
section examines empirical evidence to see if
and how inflation targets have changed the way
monetary policy reacts to economic informa-
tion. The article concludes that, while inflation
targetshaveperhapsimprovedthetransparency,
accountability, and credibility of monetary pol-
icy, it is difficult to discern any significant and
systematic changes in the way policymakers
adjust policy instruments to incoming informa-
tion after adopting inflation targets.
George A. Kahn is a vice president and economist and
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as a strategy for achieving, and then maintain-
ing, price stability. Inflation targeting regimes
share several common features. This section
describes the conceptual rationale for most infla-





jointly agreed upon by the central bank and the
government,orsetbythecentralbankitself.The
ultimaterationalefortargetsistohelpthecentral
bank achieve a desired long-run level of infla-
tion,usuallyameasuredrateofinflationconsistent
with“pricestability.”Theinflationratedeemed
consistent with price stability varies from coun-
trytocountrybutgenerallyfallswithinarangeof0
to 3 percent annually as measured by a broad
index of consumer prices.
2 Inflation targets are
designed to help the central bank achieve long-
run price stability in three principal ways: by
providinganominalanchorformonetarypolicy,
byimprovingthetransparencyandaccountabil-
ity of monetary policy, and by enhancing the
central bank’s inflation-fighting credibility.
Providinganominalanchor.Onerationalefor
inflation targets is that they supply a nominal
anchor for monetary policy. Without such an
anchor, policy actions can drift under the influ-
enceofshort-runeconomicdisturbancesand,in
the process, become inconsistent with long-
run goals. With a nominal anchor, policy is
bound to a long-run goal—such as price stabil-
ity—that ties down inflation expectations but
retains the slack needed to respond to short-run
disturbances. Traditional nominal anchors for
monetarypolicyhaveincludedmonetaryaggre-
gates and exchange rates.
During the 1980s and 1990s, a number of
countries abandoned these more traditional
anchors.Onereasonwasthattherelationshipof
monetaryaggregatestoeconomicactivitybroke
down in many countries, leaving those central
banksthattargetedmonetaryaggregatesrelying
moreondiscretionandlookingatawiderangeof
information for guidance. With most of these
central banks using a very short-term nominal
interest rate as the instrument of monetary policy,
some analysts became concerned that, without
an explicit target, monetary policy could develop
an inflationary bias. For example, if policy-
makers were slow to react to rising inflation
expectations, short-run real interest rates would
fall, leading to an increasingly accommoda-
tive policy at atime when policy might need to
be tightened.
Othercountriesthatusedexchangeratetargets
abandoned them when exchange rates became
misaligned. The problem with using exchange
rates as targets is that monetary policy must be
directed at keeping the exchange rate within its
target range, sometimes at the expense of pro-
motingfavorabledomesticmacroeconomicper-
formance.Ifexchangeratetargetsareconsistent
with favorable macroeconomic performance,
theycanworkwellasananchorforpolicy.When
exchange rates become misaligned, however, a
central bank may find itself defending the for-
eignexchangevalueofitscurrencyatthecostof
achieving goals for the domestic economy.
When this happens, speculators may attack the
currency, leading possibly to a realignment of
exchange rate targets or, at the extreme, their
demiseasaguidetomonetarypolicy.Anexam-
ple of this phenomenon occurred in the United
KingdomduringthecrisisinEurope’sexchange
rate mechanism (ERM) in 1992, when the UK
lefttheERMandestablishedinflationtargetsas
its anchor for monetary policy.
Improving transparency and accountability.
Another rationale for inflation targets is that
they can improve the transparency of monetary
6 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYpolicy and the accountability of monetary poli-
cymakers. Inflation targets are highly transpar-
ent because they convey to the public a precise,
readilyunderstoodgoalformonetarypolicy.For
example, an inflation target under which a central
bank commits to “keep increases in the con-
sumerpriceindexbetween1and3percentannu-
ally from now until the end of the year 2001”
gives the public a clear signal of both near-term
andlongertermplans.Acentralbankwithsucha
target provides a clearer signal than a bank that
simply commits to “achieving price stability in
the long run,” without specifying a numerical
definition of price stability or a time frame for
achievingit.Ofcourse,themorepreciseatarget,
the easier it is to tell whether a target is hit or
missed. And when targets are missed, policy-
makers have to explain why. Advocates of
inflation targeting argue that explaining target
misses increases transparency. Critics contend
that inflation targets might give policymakers




Along with increased transparency, inflation
targets enhance accountability.
4 They do this by
making it easier to judge whether policy is on
track.Anexplicitnumericaltargetforaspecific
measure of inflation is either hit or missed.
When the target is missed, policymakers can be
called on to explain why the target was missed.
Inmanycases,thetargetwillbemissedbecause
ofspecialcircumstancesthatareentirelyjustifi-
able. For example, if oil prices rise sharply and
unexpectedly, policymakers might be unable to
prevent a temporary increase in the overall
inflation rate.And, to the extent the increase in
inflation stemming from a one-time increase in
oil prices was expected to be temporary, the
appropriate monetary policy response might
be to do nothing, accepting temporarily higher
inflation.
5
If the target is missed because of monetary
policy mismanagement—admittedly a difficult
thing to prove given the technical nature of
monetary policy and the wide range of views
abouttheeffectsofmonetarypolicyontheecon-
omy—thegovernmentcanholdthecentralbank
accountable. Theoretically and in the extreme,
the government could dismiss the chief mone-
tary policymaker(s) or restructure the central
bank.Morerealistically,thegovernmentcanask
the central bank to improve its performance
under threat of a range of sanctions.
Enhancing credibility. One reason transpar-
ency and accountability are important is that
they potentially enhance central bank credibil-
ity. That is, they help the public understand the
goalofmonetarypolicyandthecommitmentof
thecentralbanktothegoal.Credibilityisimpor-
tant in central banking because it feeds into the
public’s formulation of expectations about
future inflation. If consumers and businesses
believethecentralbankiscommittedtoachiev-
ing price stability, they will accept lower nomi-
nal wage increases, incorporate lower inflation
and inflation risk premiums into asset prices,
andbemorewillingtomakelong-termcommit-
mentsbasedoneconomicfundamentalsinstead
of inflation expectations. This “credibility effect”




Many inflation targeting regimes share com-
mon features designed to help the central bank
achieve a more transparent, accountable, and
credible monetary policy.
Relianceonforecasts.Becausemonetarypol-
icy actions affect the economy with significant
lags, policymakers must rely on inflation fore-
casts to help them aim for an inflation target.
Specifically, monetary policy actions generally
affect output and employment with lags of six
monthsorlongerandaffectinflationwithlagsof
18 months or more. As a result, policymakers
must take action based on forecasts of inflation
ECONOMIC REVIEW · THIRD QUARTER 1998 7one to two years into the future. For example, if
under the current setting of monetary policy
instruments, inflation is projected to rise above
target one year from today, policymakers might
need to take action now to tighten the current
stance of monetary policy. Waiting to see infla-
tion rise before tightening policy may result in
missing the inflation target.
Policymakers can, and do, use a variety of
methods to forecast inflation. They can look at
privateforecasts,useinformationfromfinancial
markets,andmakeprojectionsbasedonvarious
econometric models of the economy. Whatever
the approach, a necessary condition for the suc-
cessful use of inflation targets is that the central
bankhassomecapabilityofforecastinginflation
based on the current stance of monetary policy.
And, except in unusual circumstances, the cen-
tralbankhastobewillingtotaketimelyactions
tochangethestanceofpolicywhenanunchanged
stance would lead to a target miss.
Use of inflation reports. In helping to achieve
transparency, most central banks that target
inflation regularly issue an inflation report. The
publicationoftheseinflationreportsisoneofthe
key innovations of inflation targeting regimes.
The purpose of the report is to explain what the
central bank’s inflation target is, describe how
inflation has behaved relative to its target, and
indicate where inflation may be headed in the
future.Towardthisend,someinflationtargeting
central banks actually publish their forecast for
inflation,aswellasadiscussionoftheriskssur-






ture of inflation targeting regimes is built-in
flexibility. Given the difficulty of forecasting
inflationandthelikelihoodthatmanyeconomic
shockswillhaveonlytemporaryeffectsoninfla-
tion, all inflation targeting regimes allow the
centralbanktosometimesmissitstarget.When
such misses occur, however, the central bank is
expected to explain why. Acceptable explana-
tionsincludetransitoryinflationshocksbeyond
the control of the central bank, such as changes
inoilprices,naturaldisasters,andthefirst-round
effect of excise tax changes. In addition, when
theeconomyisweakandunemploymentrising,
most inflation targeting regimes allow inflation
to temporarily exceed its target. To the extent
rising unemployment is associated with future
declines in inflation, an easing of monetary
policy may very well be consistent with the
long-run target for inflation even though it may
exacerbate the near-term overshooting of the
inflation target.
Why doesnt every central bank target
inflation?
Given the favorable rationale and features of
inflationtargets,whydon’tallcentralbankstar-
get inflation? There are three main reasons.
First,anumberofcentralbankshaveeffectively
managed monetary policy without the use of




numerical inflation targets. Second, some gov-
ernments have mandated that the central bank
achieve multiple goals. Again, in the United
States, Congress has required the Federal
Reserve “to promote effectively the goals of
maximumemployment,stableprices,andmod-
erate long-term interest rates.” Some analysts
argue that inflation targets place too great an
emphasis on the long-run inflation objective
without providing explicit short-run objectives
for output and employment variability (Cec-
chetti). And third, inflation targets require the
support of the government and, in some cases,
are given to the central bank by the govern-
ment—usually the finance minister. Unless a
political consensus has emerged that inflation
8 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYtargets are useful, governments are unlikely to
imposethemandcentralbanksarelesslikelyto
adopt them on their own.




duct monetary policy with explicit inflation tar-
gets(Table1).FollowingtheleadoftheReserve
BankofNewZealandin1990,thesebanksgen-
erally target an inflation rate below 3 percent.
The Central Bank of Chile and the Bank of
Israel target higher inflation rates—along with
exchange rates—as they seek to bring inflation
down from relatively high levels. While some
banksspecifyaparticulardateforreachingtheir
inflation targets, others do not give a time
frame—eitherforwhenthetargetmustbereached
or for how long it will be valid.
7Most countries
target a broad price measure, such as an all-
items consumer or retail price index, but allow
temporarydeparturesor“exemptions”fromthe
targets. Some countries, such as the United
Kingdom and New Zealand, have incorporated
certainexemptionsintothepricemeasureitself.In
roughly half of the countries, the government
establishesthetarget,ofteninconsultationwith
the central bank. In the other half, the central
banksetsthetargetitself.Almostallbankspub-
lish an inflation report, but only a few currently
publish an inflation forecast.
Despitethevarietyofinstitutionalprocedures
used in implementing inflation targets, most
inflation targeting regimes canbecharacterized
alongafewkeydimensions.Thissectionexam-




land, the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England,
and the Swedish Riksbank—were among the
firsttoexplicitlytargetinflationandrepresenta
range of procedures and experiences. For each
bank,thissectionexaminesthepriceindexused
as a target, some of the caveats or exemptions
employed, the inflation forecasting procedures,
and the different approaches used to ensure
transparency and accountability.
New Zealand
Prior to 1984, the Reserve Bank of New Zea-
landactedonbehalfofthegovernmentinimple-
menting the government’s daily monetary
policy decisions (Brash 1996). To do so, the
bank used “a web of regulations and direct con-
trols” until a new government, which came into
power in July 1984, introduced substantial eco-
nomic reforms (Brash 1993). The reforms
included assigning the Reserve Bank of New
Zealandthegoalofreducinginflationandgrant-
ing the central bank more independence in its
actions. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act
1989, which took effect in 1990, formalized the
goaloflowerinflationandrequiredthatthepri-
mary function of the central bank be to achieve
and maintain price stability. The Act stipulated
thattheMinisterofFinanceandtheGovernorof
the Reserve Bank of New Zealand establish an
economic target for monetary policy through a
PolicyTargetsAgreement(PTA),aformalagree-
ment between the Minister and the Governor. A
new PTA is issued whenever economic circum-
stances demand renegotiation of the previous
target, but no later than the year before a new
five-year term of the Governor. All five PTAs
issued so far (the first one in March 1990) have




should be measured in 12-month changes in the
“All Groups Consumers Price Index excluding
Credit Services” (CPIX), and that the CPIX
should be between 0 and 3 percent.
8 The PTA
mentions“unusualevents”thatcanleadtoCPIX
inflation moving temporarily outside the tar-
geted range. These events include exceptional

















































































































































































Yes No Yes Yes No No No No No
* Israel and Chile also target the exchange rate.
** The Reserve Bank of Australia dates the introduction of inflation targets to approximately April 1993 and the Bank of Spain to summer 1994.
However,Bernanke,Laubach,Mishkin,andPosenarguethatAustraliadidnotintroducetargetsuntilSeptember1994andSpainuntilNovember1994.
*** Financial Times, December 18, 1990.
****Since1990,theCentralBankofChilehasbeenrequiredbylawtoannounceeachSeptemberaninflationratetobereachedthefollowingyear.
By the mid-1990s, these targets had gained credibility.
Source:Debelle;Bernanke,Laubach,Mishkin,andPosen;ReserveBankofNewZealandsPolicyTargetsAgreement(December1997);Bankof
Canada (May 1998); Bank of England (August 1997); Sveriges Riksbank (June 1998); Bank of Israel; and Banco Central de Chile.
Table 1
SUMMARY OF INFLATION TARGETING FRAMEWORKSmovements in the prices of commodities traded
inworldmarkets,changesinindirecttaxes,sig-
nificant government policy changes that affect
prices directly, or natural disasters (Reserve




tion in explaining monetary policy and measur-
ingperformance(Bernanke,Laubach,Mishkin,
andPosen;ReserveBankofNewZealand).The
bank calculated underlying inflation by exclud-
ing from the CPI large movements in compo-
nents that reflected interest rate changes,
government policy initiatives, and oil price
changes (Reserve Bank of New Zealand, June
1997 and September 1997).
Inflation forecast. The Reserve Bank of New
Zealandusesasystemofmodelscomplemented
byjudgmenttoprepareitseconomicprojections
and inflation forecast. The system consists of a
comprehensive “core” macroeconomic model,
partial “satellite” models that analyze specific
components of the economy in more detail, and
“indicator” models which use statistical tech-
niquestomakeshort-termprojectionsbasedona
range of current economic indicators. The fore-
cast is conditioned on inflation staying at the
midpoint of the inflation target range, and its
goal is to pinpoint the path for monetary condi-
tions(exchangerateandinterestrates)neededto
maintain the target (Reserve Bank of New Zea-
land 1997).
Transparency.TheReserveBankofNewZea-
land Act 1989 requires the bank to produce a
statement at least every six months. The state-
mentmustexplainthebank’splantoimplement
monetary policy in a way consistent with the
PTA’s objective and comment on the bank’s
inflationforecastandonvariousleadingindica-
tors (Fischer 1995, Reserve Bank of New Zea-




Projections every March and September, the
Governor gives numerous speeches, and the
bank maintains a comprehensive, easy-to-
understand Internet site. The Monetary Policy
Statements and Economic Projections review
recent monetary policy, give forecasts of many
economic variables, including inflation, and
assessmonetaryconditionsandriskstothefore-
casts(ReserveBankofNewZealand,June1997;
Reserve Bank of New Zealand 1998). Because
of a highly transparent policy, the bank has
oftenbeenabletoachieveadjustmentstomone-
tary conditions by communicating its desired
path of policy, without actually intervening
directly in the market (McCallum).
Accountability. According to the Reserve
Bank Act, the Governor is held accountable for
the outcome of monetary policy. The Governor
can be dismissed if either the Minister of
Finance or the bank’s Board of Directors
believes performance has been inadequate.
Inadequate performance in monetary policy
can be measured by comparing the PTA, which
forms a contract between the government and
the Governor, with the inflation outcome. To
explain monetary policy actions and their com-
pliance with the PTA goals, the Governor is
required to produce a policy statement at least
once every six months (Fischer 1995, Reserve
Bank of New Zealand 1996).
Canada




used various monetary and credit aggregates as
guidesformonetarypolicy,butithadneitheran
explicit target nor a time path for achieving a
long-term goal (Freedman 1995a). In February
1991, the Governor of the Bank of Canada and
the Minister of Finance jointly announced a
series of formal targets for reducing inflation.
ECONOMIC REVIEW · THIRD QUARTER 1998 11The goal was to lower inflation to the midpoint
of an assigned range—between 1 and 3 per-





the overall consumer price index. The target is
announcedasarangewhosemidpointistheulti-
mate target level for the specified time horizon.
The original goal to keep inflation close to the
midpointofarangebetween1and3percenthas
been extended twice: In December 1993 to last
until the end of 1998, and in February 1998 to
lastuntiltheendof2001(BankofCanada,May
1998). For the short run, the bank focuses on
“underlying” inflation, which excludes volatile
food and energy prices as well as large first-
roundchangesinindirecttaxesfromtheoverall
consumer price index (Freedman 1995a; Bank
of Canada, November 1997). In addition, large
increasesinoilpricesand“unexpecteddevelop-
ments,” such as natural disasters, are treated as
caveatsorexemptions.Aftersuchshocks,infla-
tion needs to return to the target level with no
compensation for the resulting change in the
price level (Ammer and Freeman, Almeida and
Goodhart).
Inflation forecast. While the Bank of Canada
doesnotpublishaquantitativeinflationforecast
(it only publishes a nontechnical, qualitative
“outlook” for inflation), it still uses forecasts in
conducting monetary policy. According to
Freedman and Longworth, the Bank of Canada
uses a structural forecasting model of the econ-
omy as the key initial input into the policy
process. The bank supplements the model by
using its judgment, especially for the first few
quarters. The first step in this process is for the
stafftomakeaprojectionbasedonaneconomet-
ric model. This projection is conditional on
inflation being on target and states what path
monetary conditions (short-term interest rates
andtheexchangerate)musttakeforinflationto
bewithinthetargetrangeinsixtoeightquarters.
The bank’s staff prepares a base scenario and
some alternative scenarios, which the manage-
ment uses as a starting-point for policy deci-
sions. Since the staff projections are based on
models—which naturally simplify reality and
thereforecannotaccountforallpotentiallyimpor-
tant market events—the management adjusts the
projections at the end of the forecasting process
tomakethemmorerealistic(Freedman1995b).
9
Transparency. Inflation targets were intro-
duced in Canada to make the bank’s actions
“more readily understandable to financial market
participants and to the general public” (Freed-
man1995a).Tocommunicatethetargetsandthe
policy actions, the bank publishes an easy-to-
read Monetary Policy Report twice a year. The
reportexplainsthegoalsofthepolicy,discusses
recent developments in inflation, reviews the
policy actions taken to keep inflation on target,
anddescribestheinflationoutlook.Theoutlook
covers aggregate demand and supply conditions,
temporary influences on inflation, inflation expec-
tations, and monetary indicators. While the report
describes the bank’s inflation projections quali-
tatively, it does not give a quantitative inflation
forecast,nordoesitgiveaspecifictimeframefor
theprojections(BankofCanada,November1997).
In addition to the Monetary Policy Report, the
bank periodically issues press releases about
changes in policy and has an outreach program
informing the public about monetary policy.
Furthermore,theGovernormeetsregularlywith
the Minister of Finance and appears before the
committees of the House and the Senate (Mish-
kin and Posen, Almeida and Goodhart).
Accountability. Even though inflation targets
are specified in a contract between the Bank of
Canada and the Canadian government, no for-
mal arrangements are in place for holding the
BankofCanadaaccountableiftargetsaremissed.
Indeed,thebankisrequiredneithertoexplainits
policies nor to publish an outlook for monetary
policy,andtheagreementbetweenthebankand
12 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYthe government is subject to cancellation in the
event of a political crisis (Fischer 1993). How-
ever,byobservingthebank’sactions,thepublic
can monitor the bank’s performance. Thus, the
BankofCanadaisinformallyaccountabletothe
public (Mishkin and Posen).
United Kingdom
The primary goals of monetary policy in the
United Kingdom since the early 1980s have
beentoachievepricestabilityandtoimprovethe
credibility of monetary authorities. In the early
1980s,theauthoritiesusedmonetaryaggregates
as targets. In 1986, they switched to informal
exchange rate targets. From 1990 to 1992, the
UK participated in the Exchange Rate Mecha-
nism (ERM) of the European Monetary System
(EMS), pegging the exchange rate of the pound
to other European exchange rates. In this way,
the UK “imported” price stability by linking its
monetary policy to the policies of other European
countries (mainly Germany). After suspending
sterling from the ERM, the United Kingdom
needed a new anchor for its monetary policy. In
October 1992, the Chancellor of the Exchequer
announced the initial inflation target (Bowen,
McCallum).
At the time, the Bank of England had little
independence from the Treasury. In May 1997,
however,thebankgainedmoreautonomywhen
the Chancellor announced that the government
was giving the bank “operational responsibility
for setting interest rates to meet the Govern-
ment’s inflation target.” In addition, the Chancel-
lor announced that the bank’s Monetary Policy
Committee (MPC) was to make operational
decisions (Bank of England, August 1997).
Price index and caveats. The Chancellor
expresses the inflation target in terms of 12-
month changes in the retail price index exclud-
ingmortgageinterestpayments.Thecurrenttar-
get rate of inflation is set at 2.5 percent.
Recognizing that shocks and disturbances can
lead to a deviation from the target, the rate of
inflationisallowedtostrayfromthetargetbyup
to 1 percent before the bank must justify the
deviation (Bank of England, August 1997).
10 In
addition,effectsofindirecttaxes,subsidies,and
interest costs are treated as caveats or exemp-
tions, allowing inflation to move temporarily
away from the target (Almeida and Goodhart).
Inflationforecast.TheBankofEnglandbases
its forecasts on several models and key informa-
tion variables. The bank uses atheoretical single-
equation techniques for its short-term projec-
tions (three months) and a structural model for
its medium-term projections (approximately two
years).Tocomplementthestructuralmodel,the
bank’sstaffhasturnedtousinginformationfrom
a wider set of quantitative models (including
detailed sectoral models) and qualitative infor-
mation (such as surveys), encompassing a vari-
etyofrealandmonetaryinformation(Haldane).
Britton,Fisher,andWhitleydescribethefore-
casting process since the MPC took charge of
monetary policy as a “series of meetings between
the MPC and the Bank staff.” The focus of the
first meeting is to identify the key assumptions
oftheforecasts.Thestaffthenusestheassump-
tions to prepare a central projection and a risk
distribution. In following meetings, the MPC
reviews the forecasts, and the staff and MPC
make adjustments to the assumptions based on
perceived risks and new data. This process con-
tinues until the MPC agrees on a final forecast
and risk distribution, which it then publishes in
its Inflation Report. The Inflation Report pre-
sents the forecast and the risk scenarios in what
thebankcallsa“fanchart.”Thefanchartshows
theprojectedpathforinflationasanarrowconfi-
dence band, with the MPC’s subjective assess-
ment of risks as shaded distributions around the
main band. The distributions “fan out” as the
time horizon moves further into the future and
are often asymmetric, suggesting that forecast
risk can lean more in one direction than another
(Britton, Fisher, and Whitley).
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achieve a transparent monetary policy by com-
municating policy actions in a variety of publica-
tions and by publishing its inflation forecasts.
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Accordingly, the bank has introduced a variety
ofnewpublicationssinceadoptinginflationtar-
gets. The most important new publication is the
fairly technical Inflation Report. It states the
goals of monetary policy, examines an array of
recent monetary and real variables critical to
inflationary developments, explains recent mone-
tary policy actions, and publishes the quantitative
inflation forecast of the MPC. In addition, the
MPC meets on a monthly basis and publishes
minutes from its meetings two weeks after the
following meeting. The minutes also appear as
an annex to the Inflation Report.
12 When the
bankchangesinterestrates,italsoissuesapress
notice informing the public. In addition, the
GovernorandothermembersoftheMPCappear
before the Treasury on a regular basis and give
morepublicspeechesthanbefore(Almeidaand
Goodhart).
Accountability. The Bank of England is
expected to explain deviations of inflation from
theinflationtarget.Ifinflationstraysmorethan1
percent from target, the Governor of the bank
mustsendanopenletteronbehalfoftheMPCto
the Chancellor of the Exchequer. In this letter,
the Governor must explain the divergence,
describe the policy actions being taken to deal
with it, and state how long before inflation is
expected to return to target (Bank of England
1997). In this way, the Bank of England is
accountable directly to the Treasury.
Sweden
ThemaingoaloftheSwedishcentralbank(the
Sveriges Riksbank) since it gave up the gold
standardin1931hasbeento“stabilizedomestic
purchasing power” (Bäckström 1998a).
Throughthepostwarperioduntil1992,theRiks-
bank operated under a fixed exchange rate
regime.From1991to1992,thebankpeggedthe
Swedish krona unilaterally to the ECU—the
European currency unit, based on a basket of
currencies from members of the European
Union.WhenSwedenwasforcedtoabandonthe
fixed exchange rate regime in November 1992,
theRiksbankneededanewanchorformonetary
policy.InJanuary1993,theGoverningBoardof
the Riksbank introduced explicit inflation tar-
gets as the new anchor. The targeted level of
inflation was to be reached by 1995 and main-
tained thereafter (Andersson and Berg, Padoa-
Schioppa).
Price index and caveats. The Riksbank





current target rate is 2 percent, with a tolerance
interval of plus or minus one percentage
point—the same as the bank had established at
the announcement of its inflation targeting
regime in 1993 (Andersson and Berg, Sveriges
Riksbank,March1998).Thebankdoesnothave
alistofautomaticcaveats.Whenashockoccurs,
the Riksbank analyzes whether the shock will
have a temporary or permanent effect on infla-
tion, and changes monetary policy actions only
if it anticipates a permanent effect. As a result,
thebankallowsinflationtomoveoutsidethetar-
get temporarily in response to transitory shocks
suchasthefirst-roundeffectsofchangesintaxes
and subsidies. Other potential caveats include
changesinmortgageinterestcoststhataredueto
monetary policy adjustments and large external
shocks, such as oil price shocks (Bäckström
1998b).
Inflation forecast. The Riksbank uses a wide
rangeofrealandfinancialindicatorstomonitor
inflationary pressures and to forecast inflation.
To assess immediate inflationary pressures, the
bank monitors indicators such as various price
indexes,theoutputgap,capacityutilization,and
the unemployment rate.
14 For a medium-term
timehorizon(uptooneyear),thebankanalyzes
14 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYvariables such as wages, import prices, changes
intheexchangerate,andrawmaterialandinterme-
diate goods prices. For one-year to two-year
forecasts, the bank uses monetary aggregates,
interestrates,andsurveysofinflationexpectations
asindicators.Thebankevaluatestheinfluenceof
these indicators on future inflation and develops
an inflation forecast, assuming the repo rate is
unchanged.
15Thebankthenpublishesthequan-
titative inflation forecast for the following two
years and discusses alternative inflation paths
andpotentiallyasymmetricriskscenarios(Anders-
son and Berg, Sveriges Riksbank, March 1998).
Transparency. The Riksbank publishes a
quarterlyInflationReport.
16Thereportexplains
monetary policy, analyzes recent economic
developments, discusses determinants of infla-
tion and their projections, derives a quantified
inflationforecastfromthem,anddrawsconclu-
sionsformonetarypolicyfromtheforecast.The
report also contains a discussion of alternative
paths for inflation under various additional sce-
narios (Sveriges Riksbank, March 1998). Fur-
ther means to increase transparency include
public hearings before the Finance Committee
of the parliament, reviews of central bank
actionsinspeechesbytheGovernorandthestaff
(Andersson and Berg, Almeida and Goodhart),
andanInternetsiteprovidinginformationabout
monetary policy actions.
Accountability. While there is no contract,
agreement, or directive that binds the Riksbank
to pursue the inflation target, the bank is
accountableforachievingthetargetthroughthe
political process. The Sveriges Riksbank is an





elects the parliament, the bank is ultimately
accountable to the public.
III.CHANGES IN THE SHORT-RUN
CONDUCT OF POLICY:
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
While inflation targets have clearly changed
theinstitutionalframeworkandmanyofthepro-
cedures of monetary policymaking, it is less
clear that inflation targets have led to dis-
cernable changes in the way policy instruments
are adjusted in response to economic informa-
tion. On the surface, changes in the short-run
conductofpolicyseemplausiblebecauseofthe
magnitude of the procedural changes and the
fact that inflation has tended to be lower and in
somecasesmorestableaftertheintroductionof
inflation targets. However, over the last several
years,inflationhasalsobeenlowerandmoresta-
ble in many countries without inflation targets.
This section analyzes fluctuations in short-
terminterestratesforevidenceofsignificantand
systematic changes in the way monetary policy
is conducted after the introduction of inflation
targets. As in the previous section, the analysis
focusesonthefourcountrieswiththemostexpe-
rience using inflation targets. In addition, how-
ever, the experience of the United States—a
countrythathasnotintroducedexplicitnumeri-
caltargetsforinflation—isexaminedasa“con-
trol” case for weighing evidence on the
operational significance of inflation targets.
The behavior of inflation
In the sample of four countries that adopted
inflationtargetsintheearly1990s,inflationhas
declinedand,insomecases,becomemorestable
(Chart 1). Inflation targets were introduced in
these countries when inflation was in the 4 to 8
percent range—substantially higher than the
inflationratemostcentralbanksconsideredcon-
sistent with price stability. Moreover, in New
Zealand,Canada,andSweden,inflationwasris-
ingatthetimetargetswereintroduced.Inthe10
to 12 years prior to the introduction of targets,
inflation had reached as high as 20 percent in
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0% - 2% of CPI,
until December
1997:
0 %-3 %o fC P I
Note: Current target
range is stated in
terms of CPIX and is
0% - 3% of CPIX.
Current target range:
1% - 3% of CPI with
midpoint of 2%
1980 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98
New Zealand
Canada
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Chart 1 - continued






























































1980 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98
Current target:
2% of CPI ± 1%
Current target:
2.5% of RPIX
Source: See Table 3 for inflation data sources. Target data are from Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Bank of Canada, Bank of
England, and Riksbank.
United Kingdom
SwedenNew Zealand and the United Kingdom and
12-15 percent in Canada and Sweden.
All of the inflation targeting countries in the
sample have successfully brought inflation




after the introduction of targets and, in fact, fre-
quentlyundershotthetargetrangeinthefirstfew
years of inflation targeting. Since 1995, how-
ever,consumerpriceinflationhasremainedina
range of 1 to 3 percent. In the United Kingdom,
retail price inflation fell relatively quickly after
the introduction of targets, from around 4 per-
cent to a level in 1997 that was very close to its
current target of 2.5 percent. Finally, in Sweden
consumer price inflation has fallen to a rate





early 1990s in a number of countries that have
not introduced explicit numerical inflation tar-
gets. In the United States, for example, con-
sumer price inflation fell from over 5 percent in
1990toaround2percentin1997(Chart2).Thus,
while inflation targeting may help some central
banks lower inflation, the adoption of inflation
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Chart 2
INFLATION AND INFLATION TARGETS





















CPI inflationtargets has not been necessary for other central
banks to lower inflation.
Behavior of short-term interest rates
Can the improved behavior of inflation in
countries that target inflation be attributable to
changesinthewaymonetarypolicyrespondsto
incoming information? One approach to
answeringthisquestionistoexaminethebehav-
ior of short-term interest rates that are used as
policy levers by central banks. Most central
banks in recent years—whether they explicitly
target inflation or not—have come to use short-
term interest rates as the primary instrument of
monetary policy (Sellon and Weiner). Through
their control over reserves in the commercial
banking system, central banks seek to achieve
levelsofshort-terminterestratesthatareconsis-
tent with the goals of monetary policy.
Becauseofthecriticalroleofshort-terminter-
est rates in monetary policy, fundamental
changes in the conduct of policy should affect
howtheseinterestratesmoveovertime.Ifinfla-
tion targets imply a change in the central bank’s
inflation fighting commitment, they should
cause systematic changes in the behavior of
short-term interest rates. Alternatively, if the
introductionofinflationtargetsismainlyacom-
munication device designed to increase trans-
parency and accountability—and not representa-
tiveoffundamentalchangesinthecentralbank’s
inflation fighting resolve—the introduction of
inflation targets may have little impact on the
behavior of short-term interest rates.
Means and standard deviations. Nominal
short-term interest rates have, on average, been
lower and less volatile after the introduction of
inflation targets than before their introduction
(Table2).Mean“official”rates—ratesthatcen-
tralbanksfocusonintheirday-to-dayprovision
of reserves to the banking system—declined by
anywherefrom622basispointsinNewZealand
to 284 basis points in Sweden.
17 Because nomi-
nal interest rates incorporate an inflation pre-
mium, the decline in their mean primarily
reflectslowerinflation,notnecessarilyashiftin
monetarypolicy.Thestandarddeviationofoffi-
cial rates also declined in all countries, with the
United Kingdom showing the sharpest decline
andSwedentheleast.Again,thedeclineinstan-
darddeviationlikelyreflectedmorestableinfla-
tion and therefore, perhaps, a decline in the
inflation risk premium. Thus, while nominal
rates indicate that inflation expectations
changed over the two periods, they are not nec-
essarilyinformativeaboutwhethertheshort-run




of the stance of monetary policy than nominal
rates because they are adjusted for changes in
inflation expectations. Over the long run, real
rates tend toward an equilibrium level deter-
mined by nonmonetary factors. Because infla-
tionexpectationsadjustslowly,monetarypolicy
has some control over short-term real rates
through its ability to affect the level of short-
term nominal rates. When real rates are high
relative to their long-run equilibrium, monetary
policy is restrictive and, other things equal,
inflation tends to fall. When real rates are low
relative to their long-run equilibrium, monetary
policy is accommodative and, other things
equal, inflation tends to rise.
Real “official” rates have tended to be higher
after the introduction of inflation targets than
before their introduction (Table 2). Of the four
countries in the inflation targeting sample, only
Canada has seen a decline in real rates after
introducing inflation targets, but the decline
wasfromanalreadyhighlevel.Incontrast,inthe
United States real short-term interest rates have
falleninthe1990srelativetotheiraverageinthe
previous 20-year period. Thus, the introduction
of inflation targets seems to be associated with
an increase in real rates—possibly suggesting
ECONOMIC REVIEW · THIRD QUARTER 1998 19tightermonetarypolicyhasbeenassociatedwith
inflation targets. Alternatively, real rates may
havebeenhigherintheinflationtargetingperiod
because,formostcountries,theperiodhasbeen
characterized by cyclical expansion.
18 At the
same time, real rates have been less volatile in
the 1990s in both the inflation targeting coun-
triesandintheUnitedStates.Thedeclineinthe
standard deviation of the real official rate could
reflect a more muted response of monetary pol-
icy to economic shocks or simply a more stable
economicenvironment.Inanyevent,theperiod
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New Zealand Canada
United
Kingdom Sweden United States*
Mean
Nominal rate:
Before 15.73 10.86 11.38 9.51 8.58
After 9.51 5.52 6.05 6.67 4.77
Real rate:
Before 4.72 4.30 2.76 1.75 2.52
After 7.45 4.07 3.20 5.01 2.12
Standard deviation
Nominal rate:
Before 4.45 2.78 2.67 3.46 3.28
After 2.43 1.87 .85 1.96 1.11
Real rate:
Before 19.40 4.76 8.69 8.45 4.22
After 4.43 3.05 4.92 5.37 2.15
Sample period
Before 1979:2-1990:2 1977:10-1991:1 1975:2-1992:9 1971:1-1992:12 1971:1-1990:12
After 1990:3-1998:3 1991:2-1998:2 1992:10-1998:5 1993:1-1998:4 1991:1-1998:5
Table 2
OFFICIAL RATES BEFORE AND AFTER INFLATION TARGETS
Summary statistics
* In the absence of a regime shift to inflation targets, the sample is arbitrarily split at 1990:12 in the United States.








CPI), and U.S. Department of Labor (U.S. CPI).of inflation targeting has been universally asso-
ciatedwithrelativelyhighandstablerealrates.
Policy reaction functions. To the extent high
realinterestratesareassociatedwithtightmone-
tary policy, they indicate a desire by central
bankstolowerinflation.Theydonotnecessarily
indicate that inflation targets have led to a
change in the response of policy to near-term
economic conditions. One way to estimate how
policymakers respond to incoming economic
information is to estimate a “policy reaction
function.” A policy reaction function is a rela-
tionshipbetweenthelevelofthenominalofficial
rate and key economic indicators that policymak-
ersuseasinformationvariablesinadjustingpol-
icy. Possible information variables include
recent data on inflation, unemployment, and
exchangerates.Policymakersmayusevariables
such as these in an implicit reaction function
becausetheycareaboutthemdirectlyorbecause
the variables are reliably related to other vari-
ablestheycareabout—suchasfutureinflation.
While no central bank uses an explicit policy
reaction function in setting the short-run stance
ofpolicy,analystshaveestimatedsuchfunctions
as a way to summarize the decision making
processofmonetarypolicymakers.Estimatinga
policy reaction function before and after a fun-
damentalshiftinthemonetarypolicyregimecan
provide insight about how the regime shift
affected the short-run conduct of policy. If, for
example, the introduction of inflation targets
affected short-run policy decisions, one would
expect a change in the nature of an estimated
reaction function.
Estimatedreactionfunctionsforthefourinfla-
tion targeting countries show some indications
ofchangesintheshort-runconductofmonetary
policy resulting from the introduction of infla-
tion targets (Table 3). These reaction functions
were estimated as a linear regression of the
nominal “official” rate on a constant, seasonal
dummies (not reported), and lagged values of
the official rate, the inflation rate (as measured
by the operationally relevant price index), the
unemployment rate, and the trade-weighted
exchange rate. The same number of lags was
included for each explanatory variable, but var-
ied from country to country based on goodness
of fit criteria. The regressions were estimated
usingmonthlydataforallcountriesexceptNew
Zealand, where quarterly data were used
because of the unavailability of monthly statis-
tics on inflation.
For all of the inflation targeting countries
exceptNewZealand,atleastoneofthevariables
that was statistically significant in explaining
the official rate before the introduction of infla-
tion targets lost its significance after the intro-
duction of targets. In Canada, lagged unemploy-
mentand the laggedexchangeratelostexplana-
tory power. In the UK, lagged inflation and the
lagged exchange rate lost explanatory power.
19
And in Sweden, the lagged exchange rate lost
explanatory power.
20 In contrast, in the United
States, where the sample period was arbitrarily
splitinJanuary1991,thesignificanceofcoeffi-
cients in the policy reaction function remained
fairly similar across the two periods.
While the overall deterioration in the signifi-
cance of explanatory variables in the policy
reaction functions of the inflation targeting
countriesmayindicatechangesintheconductof
policy, the deterioration may also reflect the
smaller sample size in the post-inflation target-
ing period. In addition, some coefficients in the
reactionfunctionwerelikelylesspreciselyesti-
mated because of less variation in the nominal
officialrateandtheexplanatoryvariablesinthe
inflationtargetingperiodthanintheearlierperiod.
Another approach to evaluating whether the
policyreactionfunctionchangedfundamentally
inresponsetotheintroductionofinflationtargetsis
to test the equation’s overall statistical stability
(Table3,“breakpointtest”).Thehypothesisthat
all of the coefficients jointly are the same in the
ECONOMIC REVIEW · THIRD QUARTER 1998 21two sample periods is rejected at the 5 percent
significance level in New Zealand and at the 1
percent level in the United Kingdom—indicat-
ingthepossibilityofastructuralshiftinthepol-




the policy reaction function after the UK broke
away from the ERM. After leaving the ERM,
monetary policy in the UK was freed up to pur-
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Table 3
OFFICIAL RATE EQUATIONS
New Zealand Canada United Kingdom Sweden
Before After Before After Before After Before After
Explanatory variables
Constant Coefficient 5.075 8.170 2.100 .712 .922 2.153 .348 .279
Standard error 3.247 3.107 .605 .658 .335 .691 .294 .579
Lagged
official rate
Sum of coefficients .839 .325 .912 .955 .983 .782 .970 .974
Standard error .104 .291 .031 .031 .019 .068 .016 .021
F-statistic 17.113 5.495 464.777 463.393 1494.078 65.797 3513.525 2056.632
Lagged
inflation
Sum of coefficients -.224 .786 .000 -.030 -.018 -.020 .003 .004
Standard error .186 .327 .031 .024 .009 .033 .008 .010
F-statistic 2.055 2.403 .000 .786 1.916 .515 .123 .161
Lagged
unemployment
Sum of coefficients -.035 -.453 -.105 -.027 -.053 -.092 -.031 -.029
Standard error .562 .153 .042 .063 .022 .031 .071 .070
F-statistic 5.949 2.550 3.296 .106 5.893 4.879 .187 .171
Lagged
exchange rate
Sum of coefficients -.158 -.062 .009 -.004 -.012 .002 .009 .001
Standard error .047 .034 .003 .003 .003 .003 .004 .002
F-statistic 4.810 1.657 3.294 1.269 15.408 .371 6.035 .457
Summary Statistics
Adjusted R-squared .905 .931 .917 .941 .943 .861 .932 .974
Standard error of estimate 1.401 .666 .793 .463 .644 .313 .905 .311
Number of lags 4 2 2 1
Breakpoint
test
F-statistic 2.207 1.067 2.032 .233

















* Significant at 10 percent level.
** Significant at 5 percent level.
*** Significant at 1 percent level.
Note:ObservationsaremonthlyforallcountriesexceptNewZealand.ForNewZealand,theregressionswererunwithquarterlydata.Foreachcountry,all
explanatoryvariableswereconstrainedtohavethesamenumberoflags.TheoptimallaglengthwasdeterminedusingtheAkaikecriterionandtheSchwarz
criterion on the sample before the introduction of inflation targets. All regressions included seasonal dummy variables.
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*sue domestic goals such as employment growth






from exchange rate stability or to the accompa-
nying shift to inflation targets.
In contrast, the hypothesis of no structural
shift could not be rejected for Canada and Swe-
den, indicating no change in the policy reaction




To get a sense of the economic importance of
possible structural changes—whether statistically
significantornot—thepolicyreactionfunctions
estimated for the pre-inflation targeting period
weresimulatedoverthepost-inflationtargeting
period. A “static” forecast of the equation—in
which actual values of the lagged official rate
andotherexplanatoryvariableswerefedintothe
policy reaction function estimated for the pre-
inflation targeting regime—shows a relatively
good performance (Chart 3). Although in New
Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom pre-
dicted official rates were consistently above the
actual rate for prolonged periods of time, the
equations in all countries except New Zealand
pickedupmostoftheturningpointsintheactual
officialrates.InNewZealand,thepredictedoffi-
cial rate is much more volatile than the actual
rate—suggesting the possibility of a reduced
sensitivityofofficialratestoeconomicinforma-
tion in the post-inflation targeting period.
A more challenging test of forecast perform-
ancecomesfroma“dynamic”simulationofthe
policyreactionfunctionestimatedfromthepre-
inflation targeting regime (Chart 4). In the
dynamicsimulation,forecastsoftheofficialrate
fromtheestimatedreactionfunctionareplugged
into the right-hand-side instead of actual rates.
Theresultsclearlyshowapersistentoverestima-
tionofthelevelofofficialratesinNewZealand,
Canada, and the United Kingdom based on the
policy reaction function from the pre-inflation
targetingregime.
23IntheUK,theoverprediction
is the result of the sharp decline in the value of
the pound at the beginning of the post-inflation
targeting regime. While the “before” policy reac-
tionfunctionpredictsofficialrateswouldrisein
response to such an exchange rate depreciation
(in accordance with a policy that targeted the
exchangerate),thisreactiondidnotoccurinthe
ECONOMIC REVIEW · THIRD QUARTER 1998 23





Constant Coefficient .382 .627
Standard error .329 .273
Lagged
official rate
Sum of coefficients .973 .940




Sum of coefficients .005 -.026




Sum of coefficients -.014 -.062




Sum of coefficients -.003 .000
Standard error .003 .001
F-statistic 1.253 .345
Summary Statistics
Adjusted R-squared .948 .982
Standard error of estimate .746 .148
Number of lags 2
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Chart 3






















































































































Chart 3 - continued
PROJECTED AND ACTUAL OFFICIAL RATES
Static forecasts
Note: Observations are monthly for Canada, the United Kingdom, and Sweden, and quarterly for New Zealand.
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Chart 4
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United Kingdom
Chart 4 - continued
PROJECTED AND ACTUAL OFFICIAL RATES
Dynamic forecasts
Note: Observations are monthly for Canada, the United Kingdom, and Sweden, and quarterly for New Zealand.


































In Canada, the overpredicition is also due to
exchange rates, but for the opposite reason.
While the Canadian dollar appreciated sharply
after the introduction of inflation targets, the
“before” reaction function predicted official
rateswouldriseinresponse.
24
To put these results in perspective, the same
experimentwascarriedoutfortheUnitedStates
(Chart 5). Although the United States did not
adopt explicit inflation targets, a dynamic simula-
tion of the policy reaction function estimated
over the period from 1971 to 1990 shows the
same characteristic overprediction of official
rates after 1990 as did the simulations for New
Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom. The
implicationisthatpolicyreactionfunctionsmay
beapoorwaytocharacterizepolicyorthatthey
shift in response to a variety of circumstances
instead of or in addition to the establishment of
inflation targets.
IV. CONCLUSION
The introduction of explicit numerical targets
forinflationhasledtoanumberofhighlyvisible
changes in the procedures central banks follow
in conducting monetary policy. These proce-
duralchangeshavearguablyincreasedthetrans-
parency and accountability of monetary policy.
Throughthischannel,policymakershavepossi-
bly improved their inflation fighting credibility.
Evidence is mixed, however, as to whether
inflation targets have led to changes in the way
central banks conduct monetary policy in the
shortrun.Thelackoffirmevidencemaybedue
to the relative scarcity of data from inflation
targetingregimes,whichhavebeeninplacefor
less than a decade. Alternatively, inflation tar-
gets may simply formalize a monetary policy
strategythat,inmanycases,wasalreadyimplic-
itly in place.
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Chart 5
PROJECTED AND ACTUAL OFFICIAL RATES
Note: Observations are monthly.
Source: See Table 2 for actual official rate. Projections based on authorscalculations using before regression from Table 3.
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1 For a comprehensive discussion of the rationale for and
features of inflation targets, see Bernanke, Laubach,
Mishkin, and Posen.
2 See Kahn for a summary of views about how central
bankers should define price stability for monetary policy
purposes.
3 Proponents counter that inflation targets merely keep
discretionarypolicyactionsconsistentwithlong-rungoals
andthereforedonotpreventpolicymakersfromcountering
short-run disturbances (Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997).
4 This does not imply that central banks that do not have
inflation targets are not accountable. For example, in the
United States, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors is
requiredtosubmitareportontheeconomyandtheconduct
of monetary policy twice a year to Congress. In addition,
theChairmanoftheFederalReserveBoardofGovernorsis
calledtotestifyonthereportbeforetheSenateCommittee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the House
Committee on Banking and Financial Services.
5Foradiscussionoftheeffectsofoilpricesoninflationsee
Kahn and Hampton.
6 Evidence on whether inflation targets have increased
credibility and therefore reduced the cost of disinflation is
inconclusive (Johnson).
7 Some countries, such as Sweden, set an initial target that
remains in place today.
8 Credit services represent the consumer cost of repaying




as the growth rates of monetary aggregates, credit, total
spending, and wage settlements, are used as additional
guides for policy decisions (Freedman 1995a).
10TheChancellorhaschangedtheinterpretationoftargets
threetimes:InOctober1992(rangebetween1percentand
4 percent), June 1995 (at or below 2.5 percent,
acknowledging that shocks can make inflation move
between 1 percent and 4 percent), and June 1997 (2.5
percent, acknowledging that shocks can make inflation
move plus or minus 1 percent). The targets are valid from
the announcement date onward.
11Thebanktypicallypublishesashort-termforecastandan
approximately two-year-ahead forecast. The forecasting
horizon has been extended some recently.
12Priortothebank’soperationalindependenceinMay1997,
theGovernormetwiththeChancelloronamonthlybasis.
13 The bank uses several measures of underlying inflation
in its analysis. They are used as indicators of inflationary
pressures, not as official targets. The “headline” CPI is
regarded as the most transparent and unambiguous
measureofinflation,whichgivesitamoreobjectiveappeal
thanothermeasures,andmakesitmoresuitableforatarget
(Andersson and Berg; Sveriges Riksbank, March 1998).
14 The output gap measures the divergence of actual
production from what is considered its potential level.
15TheRiksbankusesthereporate(rateatwhichitagreesto
repurchasesecurities),thelendingrate,andthedepositrate
for monetary policy purposes (Sveriges Riksbank 1997).
16 The Bank introduced the inflation report initially in
October 1993 under the title “Inflation and Inflation
ExpectationsinSweden,”whichwaspublishedthreerather
than four times a year (Almeida and Goodhart, Andersson
and Berg).
17 For Canada and the UK, the interest rate used as the
“official” rate is the rate monitored or controlled by the
central bank. For Sweden, the 3-month interest rate was
used as a proxy for an official rate because data on official
rates were not available. In New Zealand, the discount
rate—whichmovedcloselywiththe3-monthrateoverthe
partofthesamplethatthe3-monthratewasavailable—was
used as a proxy for the official rate because it was the only
short-term rate available for the entire sample.
18 In addition, to the extent inflation rose in the period
before the introduction of inflation targets, real rates may
have been kept too low.
19 This result might be explained by a forward looking
monetary policy focused on inflation targets if the
unemploymentratehelpedpredictfutureinflationbutother
variablesdidnot.Surprisingly,inallcountriesexceptNew
Zealand, the coefficients on lagged inflation were
insignificant (and sometimes negative) in the inflation
targeting period.
20 Because in Sweden there appears to be a break in the
unemployment series in the early 1990s, the regressions
were also run using industrial production in place of
unemployment.However,inthesealternativeregressions,
industrialproductionalsocameininsignificantinboththe
before and after periods.
30 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY21 In New Zealand, the breakpoint also corresponds to the
granting of operational independence to the Bank of New
Zealand.
22 The UK targeted exchange rates during only part of the
sample period before the introduction of inflation targets.
Prior to the use of exchange rate targets, the Bank of
England targeted various monetary aggregates.
23 When industrial production is substituted for
unemployment in the Swedish “before” regression, the
Swedish official rate is also persistenly over-predicted.
24Itisnotclearwhythepolicyreactionfunctionindicates
thatpolicywastightenedinCanadainthebeforeperiodin
response to an exchange rate appreciation.
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